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Abstract
This paper begins by looking at the characteristics associated with poverty in East-Central 
Europe, using a longitudinal cross-sectional sample survey of 11 countries conducted 
between 1991 and 1998 at five time points. There is a trend analysis of changes in levels of 
poverty in different countries using three indicators of poverty. These indicate very different 
patterns of poverty for the different post-communist countries, with the people of some 
countries (the Central European countries) getting gradually richer and the people of other 
countries (the former Soviet Union) getting poorer.
The paper then considers the characteristics of those who have suffered economic hardship.
The second part of the paper looks at the characteristics of those who expressed an interest 
in migration, this time concentrating on the Central European countries which have petitioned 
to join the European Union. The people who are poorest are not necessarily the ones who 
will migrate — indeed migration could be seen as an entrepreneurial strategy for improving 
living standards. Drawing upon qualitative interviews with migrants the paper goes on to look 
at the circumstances of migrants arguing that they should be situated in the context of 
household strategies and social networks in the region.
Zusammenfassung
Im ersten Teil dieses Papers werden unter Bezug auf eine Querschnittsumfrage in elf 
Ländern, die zwischen 1991 und 1998 zu fünf Zeitpunkten durchgeführt wurde, die 
charakteristischen Merkmale von Armut in Osteuropa diskutiert. Eine Trendanalyse der 
Veränderungen in der Ausprägung von Armut in den verschiedenen Ländern unterscheidet 
drei Indikatoren. Sie weisen auf sehr unterschiedliche Arten von Armut in den post­
kommunistischen Ländern hin, wobei die Bewohnerinnen zentraleuropäischer Länder 
allmählich reicher und jene der früheren Sowjetunion ärmer werden.
Danach werden die Charakteristika jener, die ökonomische Notlagen erleben, präsentiert.
Der zweite Teil des Papers behandelt die Merkmale jener Personen, die Interesse an 
Migration zeigen, und konzentriert sich dabei auf die zentraleuropäischen Länder, welche die 
Aufnahme in die Europäische Union anstreben. Es zeigt sich, daß nicht unbedingt die 
ärmsten Personen Interesse an Migration haben; vielmehr kann Migration als 
unternehmerische Strategie zur Verbesserung des Lebensstandards betrachtet werden.
Basierend auf qualitativen Interviews werden abschließend die Lebensumstände von 
Migrantlnnen im Kontext von Haushaltsstrategien und regionalen sozialen Netzwerken 
beschrieben.
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Introduction
The transformation of communist societies after 1989 was thought at first to put all of the 
countries of East-Central Europe on the road to democracy and a market economy. It is now 
clear that the impact of transformation has been very different in the different countries of the 
region and that these differences mean that there are divergent paths of transition for 
different groups of countries.1 It is not even certain that all the transitions in these countries 
are heading in the direction of democratic and market societies. In some cases, they seem to 
be going in quite another direction, towards authoritarian nationalist or quasi-communist 
regimes, for example. In some countries the economy has declined steadily since the 
“revolutions” as have the living standards of their citizens. In other countries there has been 
an improvement in living standards since the regime change, although not always 
continuous. The transformation of societies in East Central Europe has thus meant 
impoverishment rather than improvement for many people. However, it has also brought 
increased, even undreamed of, wealth to other people. In this paper we look at what outcome 
there has been for different groups of countries and what are the different population groups 
who are "winners" or “losers” of the transition. However, we also consider this in the context 
of one possible reaction -  migration.
It was believed at first that the stark contrasts in living standards between the different East- 
Central European countries and the European Union would mean that millions of people 
would sweep across the borders into Western Europe as soon as those borders were 
opened. It was feared that these migrants would cause increasing burdens on the already 
straitened European welfare states. This has not happened. These fears have been revived 
in the context of the recent crisis in the Russian economy. Our contention is that these views 
were misfounded because they were based upon flawed and simplified models of migration. 
In particular they did not distinguish between short-term economic migration and emigration, 
and they failed to take into account the role of individual migrants in relation to their 
household.
Although some migration has taken place, there has been a dramatic increase in mobility. 
There are a great many people crossing borders, and many more border crossing points 
have been opened to cope with this. Mobility increases the economic and cultural 
communication between peoples but does not necessarily introduce strains on the welfare 
state. On the contrary, the costs of reproduction are born by the sending countries. It 
improves trade. It can be the seedbed of new entrepreneurial activities. It has helped many 
households in countries with collapsing economies to survive. Often it takes place in the
1 Wallace and Haerpfer 1998a.
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context of the informal rather than the formal economy. However, it can also lead to rising 
xenophobia and increasingly exploitative treatment of migrants.2
In our research we have considered the subjective views of people in Central and Eastern 
European countries their own opinions about how the changes have affected them. We have 
also conducted surveys about migration potential and participation in the informal economy.3 
These cross-sectional representative surveys have been conducted on a regular basis since 
1991. These data are complemented by qualitative data in which we look at the experiences 
of different kinds of migrants4 and the survival strategies of households in selected countries.5 
In order to understand the role of migration as a part of a survival strategy against economic 
hardship and falling living standards, it is important to conduct empirical research amongst 
the people of Eastern and Central Europe to find out what they are really doing, instead of 
relying only upon macro-economic indicators. Here we have first looked at macro-economic 
indicators, but then we have looked at the subjective views of the people of Central and 
Eastern Europe about their own situation. Finally, we have considered the strategies adopted 
by households to survive in the formal and informal economies. In other words, it is important 
to reconstruct the economy from the bottom up.
2 Sik 1998, Haerpfer and Wallace 1997.
3 IOM report 1998, Haerpfer 1998.
4 Wallace et al. 1997, Wallace et al. 1998.
5 New studies underway which involve a qualitative study of households in Ukraine, Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary 
are funded by the European Union INTAS scheme and the Jubllaumsfonds of the Austrian National Bank.
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PART A: THE PICTURE OF POVERTY
Economic conditions in different post-communist countries
We have already indicated that there are increasing divergences between different post­
communist countries.6 This is illustrated in chart 1 which shows the GDP per capita in 
different countries (US dollar equivalents, Purchasing Power Parity Measures). This is a 
useful economic indicator, because it shows the real wealth of the citizens of each country in 
comparative perspective.7 We can see that the post-communist countries fall into three main 
groups. In the first group we have the advanced transition countries: Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Four out of these five countries are candidates for 
entry into the European Union and they could be said to be among the most successful of the 
reform countries. In these countries the GDP per capita income has risen since 1990, 
although usually after an initial slump. Slovakia, with her problems of democratic reform has, 
nevertheless, enjoyed economic growth similar to her Central European neighbours. Slovenia 
and the Czech Republic are the wealthiest countries, with GDP per capita not far behind the 
European Union average. However, they are still two or three times lower than the nearest 
EU neighbours -  Austria and Germany -  which happen to be some of the wealthiest EU 
countries. These countries all have direct borders with Germany and Austria, and their 
citizens can cross freely for short periods of time. Many are employed on short-term labour 
contracts in Germany and Austria8 although such employment seems to have declined in the 
last couple of years as more economic opportunities have opened up at home.
Chart 1 GDP per capita in different countries 1997
25000
6 Wallace and Haerpfer 1998.
7 Statistics are from the WIIW, the Wiener Institut fiir Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche, especially from the 
report No. 248, June 1998. The PPP measures are calculated by WIIW.
8 Honekopp 1997.
4 — Wallace /  Migration and Survival Strategies in East-Central Europe — I H S
Elsewhere, we have analysed this group of countries on the borders of the European Union 
as a Central European buffer zone in terms of migration.9 This is because these are the outer 
borders of the Schengen group of countries and increasingly became targets for transit 
migrants and illegal border crossers or human traffickers from outside of the region, or even 
outside of Europe altogether. Bilateral agreements made with Schengen countries mean that 
these illegal migrants can be deported to the last country which they entered legally -  in 
many cases the buffer zone countries.10 In addition, whilst the citizens of these countries 
could enter the European Union for some months quite legally and indeed were encouraged 
to do so through various scholarship and mobility schemes, the citizens of countries to the 
east and south of the buffer zone could not. They could only get as far as the buffer zone 
itself. In this way the buffer zone became an important meeting point for westerners wanting 
to establish themselves further east (multinational companies for example, English teachers) 
and easterners wanting to establish themselves further west. Russians, Caucasians and 
even Chinese set up businesses in the buffer zone more easily than they could have done in 
Sweden or Germany. The relative prosperity of the buffer zone in turn attracted migrant 
workers from further east. The buffer zone countries were thus forced to develop migration 
policies, and these tended to be modelled on the European Union, especially their western 
neighbours, Germany and Austria. Temporary guest workers became the model for certain 
kinds of labour migration, and policies were established for refugees and asylum seekers.
The next group of countries is represented by the southern East-Central European countries: 
Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia. In these countries the transition process has not been so 
successful and has been further impeded by the Yugoslav War in the early 1990s and the 
international embargo introduced as a result.11 In these countries there has been some 
growth, but it has been uneven. In Romania and Bulgaria there has been a decline in the last 
two years as the road to reform has proven to be rather uneven, moving sometimes 
backwards and sometimes forwards. In these countries there is nevertheless considerable 
aspiration to become part of Europe and a desire to have market economies and democratic 
regimes.12 Although Croatia has enjoyed continuing economic growth since the ending of the 
war, the people there are very dissatisfied with the regime they find themselves in.13
The third group of countries are those of the former Soviet Union, represented in this graphic 
by Ukraine. In these countries, the GDP per capita has declined radically since 1990. In 
Ukraine it has fallen from 4490 to 2174 USD between 1990 and 1997. This represents a 
potentially catastrophic decline in living standards. Not surprisingly, the people in Ukraine are
9 Wallace, Chmouliar, and Sidorenko 1996.
10 See IOM reports on transit migration
11 As well as affecting the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia directly, this embargo had deleterious effects upon the 
neighbouring economies of Bulgaria, which depended upon Yugoslavia for trade, and this also encouraged the 
growth of cross-border smuggling to beat the embargo.
12 Haerpfer 1998.
13 Ibid. 1998
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in general sceptical of market and democratic reforms; many of them preferred the security of 
the past communist system.14
In addition to these countries, our own surveys included the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro) and also Belarus. There are few other surveys or statistics about 
these countries, but the situation in FRY tends to be similar to that in Croatia except even 
more extreme (extreme dissatisfaction with the current economy and political regime). The 
situation in Belarus fits more closely to that of Ukraine and Russia, although the economic 
crisis has not been as dramatic there. Belarus resembles more the authoritarian communist 
regimes of the past and claims to have economic success. At any rate, her citizens are not 
as dissatisfied as those in Ukraine and Russia.
The post-1989 transformations have resulted in high and rising unemployment in the 
countries of Eastern and Central Europe. Chart 2 shows the relative unemployment rates, 
which are highest in the Southern European countries, still rather high in the Central 
European group of countries and very low in the former Soviet Union. In the former Soviet 
Union the preferred strategy is to lay off people for “unpaid holidays" or not to pay the 
workers for periods of time rather than putting them out of work. Many people are therefore in 
work but not receiving any money. Even if they are receiving money, their incomes are 
mostly insufficient to live on. This indicator of unemployment is therefore rather meaningless 
in the former Soviet Union.
Chart 2 Unemployment in Eastern and Central Europe 1997
18 .
14 Ibid. 1998
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In addition to these differences described so far, each of these countries have experienced 
rising divergences in wealth within the population. The creation of new classes of 
entrepreneurs as well as unemployed means that there are both winners and losers from the 
reforms. A recent survey estimated the losers to be between 30 per cent and 60 per cent of 
the populations of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic.15 The losers include pensioners 
and others relying on state benefits, large families for whom family allowance has declined in 
value, the low skilled, the low educated and people living in deprived regions. It is clear from 
this and other surveys that the urban, educated and younger people support the regime 
change the most and see themselves as gaining the most from it. This is especially the case 
if they are self-employed or working in the new private sector.16
At the same time as increasing numbers of people come to depend upon the state for 
support, the state itself has been cut back due to privatisation measures but also in order to 
create a more market-oriented welfare state with work incentives.17 The fiscal basis of the 
state is undermined in some countries where it is difficult to collect taxes and where the 
informal economy takes over larger and larger parts of the economy -  this is the case in 
some southern European countries and the countries of the former Soviet Union. In all 
countries there is a "fiscal crisis" as the revenues of the state are declining but the numbers 
of people dependent on the state are increasing.
The privatisation of welfare services such as health and education takes place either officially 
as part of a privatisation strategy or unofficially as citizens have to buy their own medicines 
and educational resources when the state is unable to provide them any longer.
All of these factors have resulted in increasing inequality and greater hardship for many 
people in Eastern and Central Europe. The transformation from communism has taken place 
at their expense.
However, the official economic indicators are often unsatisfactory. They make a general 
picture rather than looking at specific population groups. Also, they measure only some 
aspects of the formal economy and leave many others unmeasured. Income, for example, is 
only of limited use in countries where incomes were low but people enjoyed social goods 
from their employment such as housing, heating, children's nurseries and holiday homes. 
Furthermore, the official economic measures are only able to look at what people do in their 
main registered employment. Other employment they may hold which may be not registered 
and in which they may not pay social security or taxes is unrecorded. In addition, many 
people are able to survive on account of various kinds of household production -  growing 
vegetables, keeping animals for domestic use and so on. These things could be called
15 Ferge, Sik et al. 1996.
16 Wallace 1997.
17 This was the conclusion of a series of studies carried out at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna, funded 
by the OECD.
I H S — Wallace /  Migration and Survival Strategies in East-Central Europe — 7
“informal economic activity" and whilst they do not appear in official statistics, they represent 
the difference between survival and non-survival, poverty and wealth for many households18. 
For these reasons, we also need to look at other data in order to understand the economic 
conditions of people in post-communist Europe, and here we turn first to surveys and then to 
qualitative data to fill out the picture of what is happening in post-communist societies.
In chart 3 we illustrate how we are using the idea of formal and informal sectors. The formal 
economy includes both the formal market sector (regulated, taxed, governed by formal laws) 
and the state sector which remains very important in each country. The informal sectors 
include the illegal marketised sector (small scale trading, extra jobs etc.), which takes place 
outside the law and is untaxed, as well as household production or self-provisioning. The 
relative importance of these sectors differs between countries and between households. 
Households survive by manipulating resources within and between each of these sectors. 
Recent research by Piirainen19 and by Rose20 indicates that the most successful strategies 
involve using resources from more than one sector together. Indeed, Piirainen argues that 
this is potentially a way in which people can not only survive but improve and consolidate 
their position in the social structure.
Subjective indicators of poverty in East-Central Europe
The surveys upon which we draw were carried out by the Paul Lazarsfeld Gesellschaft 
between 1991 and 1998 and looked at attitudes to economic and political reform, economic 
conditions, and other values in 11 post-communist countries: Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Belarus, and Ukraine (see Appendix 1 for account of surveys). These were cross- 
sectional sample surveys, carried out according to a standardised method, so that we can 
make generalisations for the population. In 1998 a number of questions about migration were 
added and some of these we analyse in this paper (only those for the Central European 
buffer zone). In the first part of this analysis we have used three indicators of poverty based 
on three separate questions in the survey: whether households are worse off than they were 
in the past before the regime changes in 1989; if they are able to live from the income from 
their main job; if they are able to save money or if they had to borrow money to get by. Here 
we begin by looking at trend data for different countries.
a. Are they worse off than before?
One basic micro-economic indicator for the extent of economic coping of post-communist 
households is the analysis of the general economic state of the individual household before 
1989 in comparison with the effects of an adaptation of household strategies after 1989. We
18 Rose and Haerpfer 1992.
19 Piirainen 1997.
20 Rose and Haerpfer 1992.
Chart 3 Relationship between different economies
FORMAL SECTOR INFORMAL SECTOR
1 State sector II Formal market economy III Informal market economy IV Household economy and 
non-monetised exchange
Primary sector 
(agriculture)
Collective/state farms Independent farmers Sale of surplus agricultural 
products at roadside and 
markets
Food, pigs etc. for household 
consumption (15% of NDB 
families)
Secondary sector 
(industry)
Many main industries Some privatised industries Sweat shops, industrial 
homeworking
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Clothes, housing by the 
household
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private sector
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teachers, many migrant 
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analysed this phenomenon by asking all respondents, If the overall economic situation of the 
own household got better or worse during the period since 1989 (see table 1). The results are 
shocking: approximately 60 per cent of all post-communist households in Central and 
Eastern Europe are worse off today than before 1989, That is, they are losers of the process 
of economic transformation from a planned economy towards a market economy. 
Nevertheless, the general impression concerning that micro-economic indicator is that the 
share of households which are either in the same economic condition compared to 1989 or 
better off than before has increased between 1991 and 1998, albeit very slowly.
Table 1: Actual economic performance of households is better or the same than 1989
Q: How do you compare your overall household economic situation with 9 years ago? Better 
today; the same; or worse today.
NDB 1 
1991
NDB 2 
1992
NDB3 NDB4 
1994 1996 
(% now better or the same)
NDB 5 
1998 Change
NDB — Mean 38 37 34 38 36 -2
1. Czech Republic 47 49 50 61 54 7
2. Slovenia 20 38 47 55 50 30
3. Poland 39 32 38 50 49 10
4. Slovakia 32 38 37 41 46 14
5. Russia 44 47 32 38 44 0
6. Romania 53 47 44 34 41 -8
7. Bulgaria 34 46 41 41 40 6
8. Croatia * * 30 30 30 0
9. Hungary 32 27 25 28 28 -4
10. Belarus * 29 18 18 21 -8
11. FR Yugoslavia* * * * * 14 *
12. Ukraine •* 20 12 22 10 -10
in 1991, only 37 per cent of all households in Central and Eastern Europe had the same or a 
better situation compared to their standard of living before 1989. Between 1992 and 1996 
that figure oscillated around 40 per cent of all post-communist households, whereas we have 
42 per cent of households, either better off or in the same condition as before the regime 
changes, in spring 1998.
However, we find important differences between the Central European buffer zone countries 
(Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia), where more people are able to 
live on their incomes and the situation is generally improving, the Southern European 
countries (Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, and FRY), where things have not got much better and
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may even have got worse, and the Eastern European block of countries (Belarus, Ukraine 
and Russia), where things have definitely got worse.
b. Participation in formal and informal economies
The informal economy always played an important part in communist societies, where it was 
an essential complement to the official economy. However, in post-communist societies, 
rather than disappearing, it took on a new importance. In the words of Endre Sik, there was a 
transformation from second economy to informal economy as the nature of the dominant 
economy changed and entrepreneurial activities were no longer illegal -  indeed they were 
encouraged.21 In some countries, the informal economy is gradually transformed into formal 
economy as a taxation system is established, laws governing industry and commerce are 
elaborated and implemented, associational life and “civil society" starts to represent the 
interests of various elements of the market society, and capitalism, from being illegitimate, 
becomes legitimate. This does not mean that the informal economy disappears -  but it is no 
longer an essential part of daily life for the majority of households. However, in countries 
where this has not happened, the informal economy takes over larger and larger areas of 
economic life. Where the state is weak or has lost control over the economy, transparent 
laws governing economic life are either not passed or are not implemented and were 
organisations which can represent different interest groups -  trade unions, consumer 
societies, employers associations -  are non existent or not able to oppose the development 
of private interest groups, then the informal economy becomes more and more important. 
Where capitalism is not governed by laws which are rational and legitimised, it is governed by 
informal values, social capital, and informal forms of organisation.22 As this develops, it is 
perhaps more and more difficult for the state to wrest back control of the economy, private 
interest groups (mafia, powerful families, and networks etc.) become more and more 
powerful. The absence left by the collapse of the state economy is filled with a private, illegal 
economy.
For this reason, we developed an indicator which could show the share of the newly 
established formal or regular economy compared to all economic activities. The higher the 
penetration of the new economic system with the formal economy, which is regular jobs, 
payment of taxes and social insurance etc., the more advanced is the process of transition 
towards a full-fledged market economy. If the informal sector is very big, which means that 
people do not pay taxes, do not contribute to social and health insurance schemes, have 
irregular jobs, than the structure of the emerging market economy is lagging behind. The first 
aim of the following indicator is to get an impression of how many households are already 
integrated in the formal and regular economy and what the size of the informal economy in a 
given post-communist country is.
21 Sik 1993.
22 Wallace et al. 1997.
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We measured the extent of penetration of the economic structure by the formal and regular 
economy by asking the households if they are able to get enough money by a regular job 
within the formal economy. If they are not, then they must use a portfolio of supplementary or 
alternative activities in the informal economy in order to have a satisfying standard of living. 
At the beginning of the New Democracies Barometer in 1991, an average of 37 percent of all 
Central and Eastern European households was able to enjoy a satisfactory standard of living 
on the basis of a regular income that is either a regular salary or a pension or other public 
transfers as part of social and welfare policies (see table 11). This share of households which 
could live basically with one or more regular incomes grew over time to 39 per cent in 1992 
and to 42 per cent in 1994. Since 1994 that percentage remained roughly at the same level of 
about 40 per cent of all households which could get by exclusively with a regular salary or 
other forms of regular income. The most recent New Democracies Barometer in spring 1998 
showed that 42 per cent of all Central and Eastern European households could survive as 
part of the official economy on the one hand and the official welfare state on the other. That 
result has the important implication that almost 70 per cent o f all Central and Eastern 
European households are unable to get by financially on the basis of regular salaries or 
regular pensions. These households are forced to develop a whole portfolio of micro- 
economic activities beyond and outside the official economy in order to survive the process of 
economic transformation.
Once again, we find important differences between groups of countries. Whereas in the 
Central European buffer zone countries at least half are able to live on their regular salaries, 
this falls below half in the Southern European countries, and in Ukraine only 8 per cent are 
able to do so. In Croatia, Bulgaria, Russia, Romania, and Ukraine, the formal economy as a 
means of livelihood was declining, sometimes quite steeply. In the Central European buffer 
zone countries, the growing share of people who are able to live from their regular incomes 
and the decline in importance of the informal economy means that the regular market 
economy is becoming more and more established as the main means of livelihood. These 
are the successful transition countries. However, in Romania, Bulgaria, Belarus, and Ukraine 
more than 80 per cent of people depend upon income outside of their regular jobs and 
salaries. We could say that in these societies, the regular market economy has not 
penetrated very far, at least in the lives of ordinary people, and the irregular economy is an 
important means of survival. We can see in the differences between 1991 and 1998 that it is 
by implication actually growing as a means of survival. Less and less people can get by on 
their regular salaries in the Southern-East European countries and in the former Soviet 
Union.
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Table 2: Getting by with regular job/income
Q: Do you get enough money from your regular job to buy what you really need?
ND B1 NDB 2 NDB 3 NDB 4 NDB 5 
1991 1992 1994 1996 1998 Change
(% reporting earning enough)
NDB — Mean 37 34 35 34 34 -3
1. Slovenia 41 58 58 45 63 22
2. Czech 46 53 58 55 58 12
3. Slovakia 39 38 46 32 53 14
4. Poland 38 34 43 41 52 14
5. Hungary 25 26 34 37 49 24
6. FR Yugoslavia * * * 38 *
7. Croatia * 28 27 18 26 -2
8. Belarus * 22 20 * 22 0
9. Bulgaria 28 29 24 36 17 -11
10. Romania 44 44 45 48 16 -28
11. Russia 31' 13 15 13 11 -20
12. Ukraine * 23 17 12 8 -15
c. Profiting, surviving or suffering?
Another subjective indicator of economic well-being that we used was to ask whether people 
had managed to save money, to just "get by" or spent their savings in the last year. This is a 
useful indicator of who might be worse off, who better off, and complements the indicators 
described so far.
Once more, we find that it is in the Central European buffer zone countries that people have 
been able to get by or even save money in the last year. Between 42 per cent and 77 per 
cent of the people in the different countries were able to get by in the last year. In the 
southern European countries the numbers are lower, but there has still been an increase in 
prosperity as measured by this indicator in all countries except for Romania, where people 
are worse off than they were in 1992 and 1994. In Romania and Ukraine the numbers able to 
get by or to profit were sinking, although in most countries, households managed to make 
ends meet by combining various different economies and different economic resources from 
outside their main jobs.
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Table 3: The share of households getting by and making savings with household 
portfolio
Q. In the past year has your family made savings or just got by or spent some savings or 
borrowed money or spent savings and borrowed money?
NDB 1 NDB2 NDB 3 NDB 4 NDB 5 
1991 1992 1994 1996 1998 Change 
(% making savings and getting by)
NDB - Mean 63 63 65 61 64 + 1
1. Hungary 68 64 67 66 77 9
2. Czech 71 72 72 75 76 5
3. Poland 74 62 69 60 74 0
4. Slovenia 69 70 78 69 68 0
5. FR Yugoslavia ★ * * * 67 *
6. Slovakia 62 65 67 68 66 4
7. Russia 62 75 77 66 * +4
8. Croatia ★ 58 62 57 65 7
9. Belarus * 61 62 45 61 0
10. Bulgaria 42 45 46 45 53 11
11. Romania 56 61 61 * 51 -5
12. Ukraine ★ 55 55 * 42 -13
Who is worse off?
So far, we have looked at general trends in poverty and the rise or decline of the informal 
sector in different countries. However, we also need to know within countries who is better off 
and who is worse off to see if this affects their inclination to migrate. For this we used the 
pooled data set to look at the effects of different socio-economic variables. We considered 
demographic indicators -  gender, age, education, town size, and marital status. Next we 
considered the internal demography of the household -  the presence of children and number 
of members. Then we considered the impact of employment using a variety of variables and 
finally the different sources of income of the household, both formal and informal. Thus, we 
considered in which sectors people were working, their experience of unemployment (as a 
household and as individuals) and what was their most important source of income inside 
and outside the different economic sectors described in chart 3.
In table 4 we can see the overall measures of association -  that is which variables were most 
strongly linked with the dependent variable -  and in tables 5-7 we can see in more detail how 
they were linked by looking at the percentages. We have taken as dependent variables our 
three indicators of poverty which we already outlined in this paper.
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We can see that gender is associated with poverty, with women being more likely to see 
themselves as poor on two of these indicators. However, in the case of the third indicator -  
situation now as compared with the past -  there was very little association. Gender is a weak 
predictor of poverty.
Age, by contrast, is not an indicator of poverty at all. There was no significant association 
between age and poverty on two of the indicators of poverty, and on the third one it is 
unreliable -  the young people in the sample would have been only children 9 years ago.
Education is a quite strong predictor of poverty, with the less educated being the worse off at 
present and feeling that they were better off in the past. This is a very strong and consistent 
finding. The former communist regimes did privilege and protect the position of ordinary 
working people. Under post-communist regimes, these people have lost out. This 
corresponds with other findings which show that the most educated feel that they have 
profited most from the changes.23
The indicator town size did not predict anything about poverty. There was no association 
between living in a rural or an urban area with subjective views of poverty.
The variable marital status was quite a good predictor of poverty. Single people were 
definitely better off, being more likely to feel that they get enough money from their main jobs, 
were able to get by without spending their savings and borrowing money and were less likely 
to think their position in the past was better. Widows are the worst off on this variable, 
followed by the divorced.
The number of children was also a good predictor of poverty -  those with more children were 
worse off and those with no children were best off. However, there was no association with 
the number of household members.
The employment status of the respondent did not show a strong association using our 
measure of association, but this is because this was a large and complex table so the 
measure of association was not very reliable. In fact, we can see from the percentage tables 
that there were big differences between different groups. Those employed full time were 
clearly the best off, especially the self-employed. The self-employed were our wealthiest 
group by far. The unemployed, pensioners, and those employed part time were the worse off 
(we assume that housewives and students are mainly living from someone else's income 
rather than their own). Having an income from employment is obviously a very important 
source of wealth. The self-employed were also less likely to say that they were better off in 
the past. They have benefited from the changes.
23 Wallace 1997.
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From this table and from other data it is evident that it is important not just to be employed, 
but also in which sector one is employed. Here we have to distinguish between the state 
sector and the private sector. However, the private sector is itself subdivided. The private 
sector can include privatised industries, which are sometimes not much different from state 
ones for their employees, and new private firms, which can be very different. The state and 
privatised industries may offer secure jobs at low salaries, whilst the new private sector 
employment offers highly paid jobs which are also very insecure.24 The new businesses 
started by self-employed entrepreneurs also seem to fall into this category of having perhaps 
higher income, but insecure employment.25 In the same way we need to distinguish between 
independent farms and those working on collective farms, whether state-owned or newly- 
released from state control. Employment sector was quite a strong indicator of subjective 
poverty, and here again we need to look at the tables, which were quite complex. Those in 
the new private sector were the best off, followed by the independent farmers. The worse off 
were those on collective farms and the civil servants (police, teachers, doctors, etc.). These 
people are also likely to think that they were better off in the past.
In terms of income, we can see a very strong association between the amount of income the 
household has and how poor they feel. Those with high income feel less poor, those with low 
income more poor. Those with low income are more likely to feel that they were better off in 
the past. There is also a strong association with sources of income. Those dependent upon 
informal economies for their main income -  growing food, using friends and family help, or 
earning money on the side -  are likely to be poor. The best off (those who could save money) 
were the ones with a main job, who received benefits from their employment and who 
speculated in currency by having foreign currency savings. Having a second job was also 
likely to significantly improve the wealth of the household.
We could say from these indicators, that the poor are the low educated, those with large 
numbers of children, the unemployed (especially if there was some unemployment in the 
household), those depending upon self-provisioning and help from friends and family as a 
survival strategy, pensioners, and state sector employees. In other words, all people 
dependent upon the declining state sector and welfare services for their main incomes. The 
newly wealthy are the self-employed, those with at least one job and possibly second jobs 
and foreign currency savings, the single and those with no children.
24 Roberts et al. 1995.
25 Roberts et al. in another study in Ukraine, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Armenia, and Georgia found however that amongst 
young people, entrepreneurship was sometimes a way of compensating for lack of a job. This study is not yet 
published.
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Table 4: Subjective poverty -  measures of strength of association
Kendal’s tau
Gender
Age
Education
Town size
Marital status
No. of children
No. of household 
members
Employment status
Unemployed last year 
(household)
Impact of unemployment 
(individual)
Employment sector
Household income 
(quartiles)
Source of income
Getting enough money Getting by 
from main job
067** 044**
Ns Ns
-121** -065**
Ns Ns
061** 045**
087** 056**
Ns Ns
ns 043**
-135** -159**
-108** -081*
-081** -049**
-200** -150**
-109** -066**
Note: Kendal's tau was used as a measure of association because it indicates 
dependent variable which Is ordinal (all three of our poverty indicators were ordinal 
variables which need not be ordinal.
** means significant at the 0.000% level and * means significant at the 0.5% level.
Current economic 
situation compared 
with past
-019*
-078**
056**
Ns
-096**
-050**
025*
-015*
067*
022 *
072**
131**
022*
the relationship between a 
variables) and independent
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Table 5: Getting enough money from main job (%)
Not enough Not enough at all
Gender
Male 37 24
Female 39 29
Age
18-19 33 35
20-29 38 27
30-39 36 27
40-49 40 26
50-59 38 25
60+ 36 29
Education
Elementary 36 38
Vocational 41 24
Secondary 38 26
University 34 20
Town size
<5000 38 29
<20 000 39 25
<100 000 38 28
>100 000 39 29
Marital Status
Single 37 23
Married/cohabiting 38 26
Divorced 33 38
Widowed 43 33
No of children
None 38 23
1 39 31
2 34 33
3 or more 31 40
No of household 
members
1 32 29
2 40 26
3 41 29
4 34 30
5+ 39 31
Employment status
Employed full time 40 26
Employed part time 34 49
Self employed 28 13
Pensioner 32 30
Unemployed 28 57
Housewife/student 19 25
T ogether
61
68
68
65 
63
66 
63 
65
74
65
64
54
67 
64 
66
68
60
64
71
76
61
70 
67
71
61
66
70
64
70
66
83
41
62
85
44
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Table 5 continued
Unemployed (household Not enough
impact)
Self 37
Other in family 36
None 38
Impact of unemployment 
(individual)
Currently unemployed 29
Formerly unemployed 38
Employed all year 38
Outside labour force 27
Employment sector
Civil servant 35
State enterprise 46
Privatised enterprise 35
New private 36
Collective farm 42
Independent farmer 33
Income (Quartiles)
1 33
2 34
3 44
4 39
Sources of income
Growing food 41
Repairing house 45
Favours 16
Help of friends/family 33
Foreign currency 35
Second job 35
Money on side 32
Main job 38
Pension/benefit 36
Benefits from work 25
Not enough at all
39
34
23
57
37
25
23
35
25
29
20
35
24
45
40
30
18
35 
21
44 
42 
28
36
45 
23 
27 
44
Together
76
70
61
86
75
75
50
70
71 
64
56 
77
57
78
74
74
57
76 
66 
60 
75 
63 
71
77 
61 
63 
69
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Table 6: Getting by
Gender
Saved
money
Got by Spent
Savings
Spent and 
Borrowed
Total who did 
not get by 
(Adding last 2 
columns)
Male 14 52 16 19 35
Female 12 50 18 21 39
Age
18-19 15 51 18 17 35
20-29 14 48 17 21 38
30-39 14 48 14 24 38
40-49 13 47 17 24 41
50-59 12 52 18 18 36
60+ 10 57 17 16 33
Education
Elementary 8 54 16 23 39
Vocational 12 52 17 20 37
Secondary 14 48 18 20 38
University 23 46 16 15 31
Town size
<5000 11 52 16 21 37
<20 000 13 49 17 21 38
<100 000 12 48 17 23 40
>100 000 13 49 18 21 39
Marital Status
Single 14 51 16 18 34
Married/cohabiting 13 50 16 21 37
Divorced 9 53 16 23 39
Widowed 8 50 21 22 43
No of children
None 13 52 18 18 36
1 12 48 17 24 41
2 12 48 15 25 40
3 or more 8 46 31 32 63
No of household 
members
1 11 50 18 21 39
2 11 50 19 21 40
3 13 48 17 22 39
4 12 48 21 19 40
5+ 12 48 17 24 38
Employment status
Employed full time 15 50 16 20 36
Employed part time 7 46 16 31 47
Self employed 31 44 13 13 25
Pensioner 9 57 18 16 34
Unemployed 5 42 22 13 22
Housewife/student 15 50 18 18 36
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Table 6 continued
Unemployment
(household) Savedmoney
Got by Spent
Savings
Spent and 
Borrowed
Total who did 
not get by 
(Adding last 2 
columns)
Self 6 44 18 32 50
Other in family 8 48 18 25 43
No-one 15 53 16 19 35
Impact of 
Unemployment
Currently unemployed 5 42 18 35 53
Formerly unemployed 8 47 18 28 46
Employed all year 16 50 15 18 33
Outside labour force 11 55 18 17 35
Employment sector
Civil servant 12 47 15 26 41
State enterprise 14 51 16 19 35
Privatised enterprise 15 51 16 19 35
New private 19 48 16 17 33
Collective farm 5 52 16 27 43
Independent farmer 12 58 16 14 30
Income (Quartiles)
1 5 47 19 29 48
2 7 50 18 26 44
3 11 49 17 23 40
4 21 48 16 14 30
Sources of income
Growing food 9 46 18 27 45
Repairing house 16 48 17 19 36
Favours 11 51 15 24 39
Help of friends/family 10 43 12 35 47
Foreign currency 22 20 28 32 59
Second job 17 48 17 19 36
Money on side 9 40 20 32 52
Main job 16 50 16 18 34
Pension/benefit 8 59 17 10 16
Benefits from work 21 31 22 27 49
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Table 7: Economic situation compared to the past
Much better in 
the past
Gender
Male 33
Female 35
Age
18-19 21
20-29 29
30-39 33
40-49 35
50-59 37
60+ 39
Education
Elementary 38
Vocational 32
Secondary 33
University 30
Town size
<5000 35
<20 000 39
<100 000 36
>100 000 35
Better in the Same as past Total of these
past columns
31 20 84
31 18 84
33 21 75
32 21 82 
31 19 83
33 17 85
30 19 86 
29 18 86
31 17 86 
33 19 84
31 19 83
29 20 79
32 19 86
33 15 87 
31 17 84
30 19 84
Marital Status
Single 26 31 22 79
Married/cohabiting 35 31 18 84
Divorced 37 31 18 86
Widowed 47 28 13 88
No of children
None 34 30 20 84
1 35 31 19 85
2 42 29 15 86
3 or more 40 31 15 86
No of household 
members
1 39 29 19 87
2 41 29 17 87
3 37 31 18 86
4 35 31 19 85
5+ 37 29 19 85
Employment status
Employed full time 31 33 20 84
Employed part time 40 34 12 86
Self employed 27 23 24 74
Pensioner 41 29 17 87
Unemployed 44 29 12 85
Housewife/student 26 31 23 80
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Table 7 continued
Unemployment Much better in Better in the Sai
(household) the past past
Self 39 31 15
Other in family 38 32 16
No-one 32 31 20
Impact of
Unemployment
Currently unemployed 44 29 12
Formerly unemployed 35 33 19
Employed all year 31 32 20
Outside labour force 35 30 19
Employment sector
Civil servant 41 34 14
State enterprise 32 32 20
Privatised enterprise 27 33 22
New private 27 32 22
Collective farm 37 37 15
Independent farmer 43 22 20
Income (Quartiles)
1 44 30 15
2 41 29 16
3 35 32 19
4 27 30 22
Sources of income
Growing food 42 28 18
Repairing house 23 31 24
Favours 32 28 20
Help of friends/family 36 31 19
Foreign currency 39 26 20
Second job 35 29 19
Money on side 34 31 18
Main job 30 33 20
Pension/benefit 38 31 16
Benefits from work 15 38 19
Total of these 
columns
85
86 
83
85
87
83
84
89
87
82
81
89
85
89
86
86
79
88
78
80
86
85
83
83
83
85
72
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PART B. RESPONSES TO POVERTY
Migration as a response to poverty?
Given that in most countries many peoples living standards have declined since 1989, and in 
some countries nearly everybody's living standards had declined, we need to ask why have 
more people not migrated?
Before embarking on the analysis of migration, we wish to make two major criticisms of 
migration studies. The first is that migration studies have traditionally not distinguished 
between short-term and long-term migration. Migration is assumed to mean that individuals 
move permanently from one country to another country. However, our study indicated that 
few people would like to do that. On the other hand, relatively large numbers would like to go 
for short periods of time, and there was a different pattern for these different kinds of 
migration. These kinds of migration need to be analysed separately, and this has important 
implications for the forms of mobility in Europe. The second criticism is that migration studies 
generally look at the behaviour of individuals, assuming that they will try to improve their 
economic position. They do not situate individuals in the context of their ethnicity, social 
networks, and especially their household situation. Our studies found that it was important to 
situate people in their social context, not just their economic context, in order to understand 
the patterns of migration that were taking place.
Here we consider the migration potential from the Central European buffer zone countries -  
Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, and Slovenia. We know from other studies that 
the people from these countries are the most likely to want to work abroad rather than 
migrate.26 In other words, people wanted to supplement their income by working abroad for 
short periods rather than moving abroad altogether. People will move out of the buffer zone 
towards their nearest western countries to work and into the buffer zone from those countries 
to the east and south. In Ukraine, working abroad is already something of an established 
activity.27
We can now look at the migration potential using the same indicators that we have used so 
far to look at poverty. Were the poor people the ones most likely to migrate?
If we look at table 8 we can see the measures of association giving us the strength of each 
independent variable against the dependent variable. Here we have also included our three 
indicators of subjective poverty used throughout this paper. In this way we can compare what 
affects poverty with what affects migration potential.
26 International Organisation for Migration 1998.
27 Drbohlav 1996, Wallace et al. 1998.
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First of ail we notice that gender is a strong indicator of migration potential -  many are most 
likely to migrate to work for a few months or a few years and are slightly more likely to 
emigrate. This is therefore different to the indicators of poverty -  there it was women who felt 
the most poor.
Age is an extremely strong indicator of migration potential. The younger are most likely to 
want to migrate. By contrast, age had little impact upon poverty.
Education is also an extremely strong indicator of migration potential. The most educated are 
the most likely to migrate, and this is exactly the opposite direction for that of poverty.
Town size is also quite a stronger factor in migration potential -  those in larger cities are the 
most likely to migrate, whereas this had little effect on poverty.
Marital status had a very strong effect on those wanting to migrate for short periods, but not 
on those wanting to emigrate. The single people are most likely to want to go for a few 
months to work in the European Union, the married people for a few years. This would be 
consistent with our idea that migration forms part of a household strategy. Working abroad is 
a way of supporting a family in the home country. This is also reflected in the fact that the 
number of children is also quite strongly associated with migration potential -  those with 
children are most likely to want to migrate as well as to emigrate.
Employment status is quite strongly associated with short-term migration but only weakly with 
emigration. It is the students, the part-time workers, and the unemployed, who are most likely 
to want to go abroad for short periods of time as well as to emigrate. Having a full-time job is 
a disincentive for going abroad. This is also reinforced by the two variables which looked at 
unemployment. Here the individual experience of unemployment has an extremely strong 
effect on wanting to work abroad, whilst household unemployment has a less strong effect. 
The employment sector, however, was not significant at all.
Household income is extremely strongly associated with the likelihood of going abroad. The 
more poor was the household, the more likely they were to want to go abroad. This also 
reflects poverty. The main source of income was also extremely strongly associated with 
migration potential. Not surprisingly, those relying mainly upon foreign currency accounts 
were most likely to want to go abroad. Those able to earn their main income from their main 
job are less likely to want to work abroad, whilst for those having to make up their income 
from other sources, going abroad was more attractive.
If we now turn to our subjective poverty indicators, we can see that not getting enough money 
from the main job is strongly associated with all kinds of migration, especially longer-term 
migration. Getting by is more weakly associated with migration -  migration was seen as 
solution for debt. However, whether a family was better or worse off than in the past had little
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or no impact on their desire to go abroad. It was present circumstances that were most 
important.
Thus, there were important differences between indicators for poverty and indicators for 
migration. Whilst women were poorer, it was men who wanted to migrate. Whilst the elderly 
were poorer, it was the young who wanted to go abroad. Whilst the lower educated were the 
poorest, it was the highly educated who wanted to leave. Finally it was those from the cities 
who were the most keen to go.
However, there were also important financial pressures which did encourage people to 
consider going abroad. The number of children they had and the number of people in the 
household were important as well as tow income. Most important of all was if they were 
unemployed (or had been unemployed) and if they were unable to earn enough from their 
main jobs. Some households even lived mainly from their foreign currency earnings (but this 
was only 51 people from the whole sample -  for most people foreign currency earnings were 
a supplementary income).
We could say therefore that being poor was not a sufficient factor for wanting to emigrate. It 
was only when people had low incomes in association with a variety of other factors (age, 
education, sex) that they were likely to think of migration as a solution. We could predict 
however that the level of earnings and the level of unemployment in the Central and Eastern 
European countries would have an impact upon people's incentives to migrate.
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Table 8: Migration potential -  measures of strength of association
Kendal's tau Work in EU few Work in EU few years Emigrate
months
Gender 083** 087** 054**
Age 270** 246** 158**
Education -150** -152** -117**
Town size -063** -075** -051**
Marital status 173** 158** 099**
No of children -072** -076** -064**
No of household -144** -140** -072**
members
Employment status 056** 044** 027*
Unemployed last year 139** 144** 092**
(household)
Impact of unemployment 199** 186** 126**
(individual)
Employment sector Ns ns Ns
HH Income (quartiles) -108** -105** -071**
Source of income 129** 129** 093**
Not getting enough from -073** -099** -082**
main job
Getting by -029* -048** -041**
Current economic ns 028* 028*
situation
Note: Kendal’s tau was used as a measure of association because it indicates the relationship between a 
dependent variable which is ordinal (all three of our poverty indicators were ordinal variables) and independent 
variables which need not be ordinal.
** means significant at the 0.000% level and * means significant at the 0.5% level.
I H S — Wallace /  Migration and Survival Strategies in East-Central Europe
Table 9; Working in EU for a few months
Gender
Yes definitely Yes probably Alt
Male 20 22 42
Female 16 18 34
Age
18-19 30 30 60
20-29 27 28 55
30-39 23 25 48
40-49 17 23 40
50-59 12 15 27
60+ 5 6 11
Education
Elementary 11 14 25
Vocational 17 20 37
Secondary 21 23 44
University 22 25 47
Town size
<5000 16 19 35
<20 000 18 23 41
<100 000 21 22 43
>100 000 20 22 42
Marital Status
Single 27 26 53
Married/cohabiting 16 20 36
Divorced 14 14 28
Widowed 7 8 15
No of children
None 16 18 34
1 21 23 44
2 21 24 45
3 or more
No of household 
members
17 23 40
1 12 13 25
2 12 14 26
3 19 24 43
4 24 23 47
5+ 22 24 46
Employment status
Employed full time 19 25 44
Employed part time 28 25 53
Self employed 21 19 40
Pensioner 5 6 11
Unemployed 22 22 44
Housewife/student 27 27 54
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Table 9 continued
Unemployment Yes definitely Yes probably Altogether yes
(household)
Self 28 23 51
Other In household 20 23 43
None 14 19 33
Impact of Unemployment
Currently unemployed 28 23 51
Formerly unemployed 29 22 51
Employed all year 18 24 42
Outside labour force 10 13 23
Employment sector
Civil servant 22 24 46
State enterprise 17 25 42
Privatised enterprise 17 24 41
New private 23 26 49
Collective farm 12 23 35
Independent farmer 16 23 39
Income (Quartiles)
1 17 15 32
2 - 18 21 39
3 21 24 45
4 22 26 48
Sources of income
Growing food 21 16 37
Repairing house 22 23 45
Favours 19 33 52
Help of friends/family 28 24 52
Foreign currency 36 13 49
Second job 28 24 52
Money on side 27 31 58
Main job 18 25 43
Pension/benefit 7 8 15
Benefits from work 30 28 58
Not enough money from
main job
Not enough 20 25 45
Not at all enough 25 24 49
Getting by
Saved money 18 19 37
Got by 15 20 35
Spent savings 20 20 40
Borrowed money 18 20 38
Spent and borrowed 23 22 45
Economic situation was
better in the past
Much better 19 20 39
Somewhat better 16 21 37
The same 15 19 34
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Table 10: Working EU for a few years
Gender
Yes definitely Yes probably Alt
Male 15 19 34
Female 12 15 27
Age
18-19 24 24 48
20-29 22 23 45
30-39 17 22 39
40-49 14 19 33
50-59 7 12 19
60+ 4 6 10
Education
Elementary 8 11 19
Vocational 13 16 29
Secondary 17 20 37
University 16 22 38
Town size
<5000 12 15 27
<20 000 16 18 34
<100 000 16 18 34
>100 000 17 20 37
Marital Status
Single 21 22 23
Married/cohabiting 12 16 28
Divorced 12 12 24
Widowed 5 7 12
No of children
None 13 15 28
1 19 18 37
2 17 22 39
3 or more
No of household 
members
13 19 32
1 11 10 21
2 10 12 22
3 16 20 36
4 21 21 42
5+ 19 24 43
Employment status
Employed full time 14 21 35
Employed part time 23 22 45
Self employed 14 16 30
Pensioner 3 5 8
Unemployed 23 20 43
Housewife/student 22 23 45
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Table 10 continued
Unemployment
(household)
Yes definitely Yes probably Alt!
Self 23 21 44
Other in family 17 21 38
No-one 10 14 24
Impact of Unemployment
Currently unemployed 24 20 44
Formerly unemployed 22 21 43
Employed all year 14 19 33
Outside labour force 8 10 18
Employment sector
Civil servant 17 23 40
State enterprise 13 20 33
Privatised enterprise 12 17 29
New private 18 21 39
Collective farm 12 17 29
Independent farmer
Household income 
(Quartiles)
17 23 40
1 12 13 25
2 15 17 32
3 16 21 37
4 18 21 39
Source of income
Growing food 17 13 30
Repairing house 15 20 35
Favours 18 19 37
Help of friends/family 23 22 45
Foreign currency 36 8 44
Second job 22 27 49
Money on side 26 27 53
Main job 14 21 35
Pension/benefit 4 6 10
Benefits from work
Not enough money from 
main job
27 20 47
Not enough 15 21 36
Not at all enough 21 22 43
Getting by
Saved money 12 16 28
Got by 11 16 27
Spent savings 16 18 34
Borrowed money 16 18 34
Spent and borrowed
Economic situation was 
better in the past
21 17 38
Much better 16 17 33
Somewhat better 12 16 28
The same 10 15 25
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Table 11: Emigrate
Yes definitely Yes probably Altogether Yes
Gender
Male 7 8 15
Female 5 7 12
Age
18-19 11 9 20
20-29 11 12 23
30-39 8 11 19
40-49 4 7 11
50-59 3 5 8
60+ 2 2 4
Education
Elementary 3 4 7
Vocational 5 8 13
Secondary 8 9 17
University 7 11 18
Town size
<5000 5 8 13
<20 000 7 9 16
<100 000 6 8 14
>100 000 8 9 17
Marital Status
Single 10 10 20
Married/cohabiting 5 7 12
Divorced 4 6 10
Widowed 2 3 5
No of children
None 6 6 12
1 9 10 19
2 7 10 17
3 or more 6 10 16
No of household members
1 7 6 13
2 6 5 11
3 7 12 19
4 10 11 21
5+ 8 11 19
Employment status
Employed full time 6 9 15
Employed part time 9 14 23
Self employed 8 8 16
Pensioner 1 2 3
Unemployed 11 12 23
Housewife/student 10 11 21
Unemployment (household)
Self 11 12 14
Other in family 7 10 14
No-one 4 6 12
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Table 11 continued
impact of Unemployment Yes definitely Yes probably Altogether Yes
(individual)
Currently unemployed 11 12 23
Formerly unemployed 12 11 23
Employed all year 6 9 15
Outside labour force 3 4 7
Employment sector
Civil servant 5 12 17
State enterprise 5 9 14
Privatised enterprise 5 7 12
New private 8 9 17
Collective farm 3 10 13
Independent farmer 5 9 14
Income (Quartiles)
1 5 6 11
2 8 10 18
3 7 10 17
4 7 10 17
Sources o f income
Growing food 7 7 14
Repairing house 5 10 15
Favours 7 10 17
Help of friends/family 11 9 20
Foreign currency 19 13 32
Second job 12 11 23
Money on side 16 12 28
Main job 6 9 15
Pension/benefit 1 2 3
Benefits from work 18 6 24
Subjective Poverty 
Not enough money from 
main job
Not enough 7 10 17
Not at all enough 10 11 21
Getting by
Saved money 5 7 12
Got by 4 7 11
Spent savings 8 9 17
Borrowed money 8 9 17
Spent and borrowed 10 8 18
Economic situation was 
better in the past
Much better 7 10 17
Somewhat better 6 7 13
The same 4 7 11
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Actual migration behaviour: qualitative studies
The actual migration behaviour (as opposed to potential behaviour that we have looked at so 
far) can only be assessed through studies of people who have actually migrated for shorter 
or longer periods of time. Here we can draw upon a range of qualitative studies, including 350 
life interviews with labour migrants and cross border traders in Poland, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Slovakia.28
A further explanation for why more people did not want to migrate can be found by looking at 
the household strategy rather than the individual migrant behaviour.29 If we take this into 
account, we can see that the single migrant is often earning money for a household rather 
than for his or herself, and his or her trip abroad forms part of a broader work strategy. For 
example, migrant Ukrainian workers which we interviewed in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia explained that they would stay abroad for the length of time they were legally 
allowed to stay in the Czech Republic or Slovakia (according to the stamp in their passports 
they were visiting as tourists) and to work, for the most part illegally, for that time. They would 
then go home and their place would be filled by a father or brother who take on the next 
"shift" so to speak. They would go home also in order to help with the harvest or to take care 
of cows, sheep, rabbits, and hens which helped the household to survive. On the way they 
would convert some of their money into goods which their wives would then sell on the 
markets at home (retail goods were hard to buy in Ukraine at that time and were cheaper in 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic), In this way, the one person who was working 
abroad was only one part of a household survival strategy which would involve a variety of 
ways of getting by.
The reason many did not leave permanently, was because they had a variety of other 
sources of income as well and they were all needed in order to survive. Thus, the migrant 
workers and traders would usually have a state-paid job as well and with this they secured 
their pensions, health and social security contributions. The formal economy was still 
important even if is importance had declined for many people as a means of livelihood. In 
addition, the migrant workers and traders often owned property as part of the family unit, 
which might include apartments and houses which they built in the countryside, a dacha or a 
plot of land. This would form the basis of the family wealth and was usually shared between a 
number of family members. Thus for example, the grandmother/grandfather might work the 
family plot and produce vegetables in the country house helped by unemployed 
grandchildren, whilst the father worked abroad and the mother brought goods across the
28 50 interviews in each country: Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary were carried out in 1995/6 and 200 in the Czech 
Republic between 1993 and 1995. Where possible, these interviews were carried out in naturalistic settings by 
interviewers using the same language as the respondent. There was an attempt to interview respondents from the 
range of ethnic groups which were arriving in the country, and this varied from country to country.
29 Stark 1991, Wallace et al. 1998.
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border to sell at home. The migration strategy involved supporting this life-style, not giving it 
up.
There was a clear incentive, giving the income differentials seen in chart 1, for at least some 
people to work abroad, but not to move abroad. By moving on his or her own side of the 
border, the migrant worker could enjoy the benefits of the purchasing power of their income 
and still take advantage of social security, health provision etc. provided in their own country.
The opening of borders involved improved communications across borders. The train 
connections were improved and the Central European countries embarked on an extensive 
road building programme, subsidised often by the European Union in order to better connect 
themselves with the West. These improved communications means that it is relatively easy 
for migrants to move backwards and forwards frequently across the borders (notwithstanding 
increased surveillance and control at the borders).
Another factor is the legislation which exists governing migrants. The apparently open 
borders admit some people more easily than others. Usually the people from the 
neighbouring countries are able to enter without visas as “tourists" for a certain amount of 
time. However, this means that they can also undertake various kinds of economic activity. 
Working permits are limited in time and granted usually on a quota basis in most countries. 
There are always more workers than working permits in the buffer zone in ratios that have 
been estimated as 1:1 or even 1:10. The legislation governing import and export of goods 
likewise tends to affect the behaviour of migrants. Usually border crossers can take with 
them a reasonable amount of goods for their own use, but must pay tax if they want to trade. 
Ukraine, however, tried to restrict even this by introducing a tax of 30% on consumer goods 
that migrants brought back for their own use. This encouraged a lot of smuggling and bribery 
at the border. Usually border crossers are therefore able to bring only small amounts of 
goods backwards and forwards for trading. These kinds of restrictions encourage people to 
come for only short periods of time, but also to go backwards and forwards frequently.
Therefore, these new patterns of mobility are encouraged by the stake which the migrant 
holds in their own countries plus the ease of transportation, making frequent crossings 
possible. This kind of cross-border commuting probably represents a “normal" condition 
between countries and is further normalised by a range of regulations governing the 
conditions and terms of work of guest workers from the East in Austria and Germany, but 
also in the central European buffer zone, where such regulations as quotas, working permits, 
and so on have also been introduced in the last years. This was under “normal” 
circumstances.
However, the biggest migration potential comes not from those countries which border the 
European Union, but rather from the former Yugoslavia (excluding Slovenia). In these 
countries very high numbers of people would like to leave, not just temporarily, but
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permanently. We could see this as abnormal conditions, because the people are driven out 
not just by economic slump (in fact incomes have risen in Croatia since the war) but by 
political conditions. People fleeing from Bosnia, Serbia, Croatia, and Kosovo make up a large 
number of the migrants in the buffer zone. In some cases they are escaping the effects of 
war and ethnic cleansing, but in other cases they are escaping military service and the 
consequences of economic collapse. They are mostly young, well educated and multi-lingual 
people who see no future for themselves at home. With increasing restrictions on asylum 
seekers and refugees in western Europe, they often settle in the buffer zone. However, few of 
them apply for asylum -  in most cases they find jobs or start businesses. These are usually 
longer-term residents and may be either legally or illegally resident.
In the case of these highly educated young migrants, they can also form virtual transmigrant 
communities as they keep in touch with people back home and in other parts of the world 
through internet and email. They can exchange news and information in this way, some of 
which may be censored back in their own country.
Other groups who are more permanently resident are those recent settlers from the far East. 
The Vietnamese, formerly in Central Europe on work contracts, have often turned themselves 
in to traders and small business people in order to be able to stay, and they are joined by 
more recent arrivals from mainland China. The Chinese are normally traders and 
businesspeople and, having originally settled in Hungary in the 1980s, can now be found in 
most Central European countries.30
However, the most common form of migration was temporary, and here two categories stood 
out on which we focused our studies: cross-border traders and labour migrants. Below we 
give a brief account of the results of our studies for each group.
a. Cross-border traders31
Cross-border trading had already been a way of importing scarce goods under the old 
systems, but it increased during the perestroika period of the 1980s and really took off once 
the borders opened. From then on trading was no longer illegal, but the official import and 
export system was too inefficient to meet consumer demand. Furthermore, the previously 
existing COMECON mutual trading arrangements broke down as soon as hard currency 
transactions were demanded, leading to scarcities of many traditional goods in the shops. 
Consumer demand was met by hundreds of thousands of people carrying suitcases across 
the border and hence the name "suitcase traders". By the 1990s from being a specialist 
phenomenon this had become a mass phenomenon.
30 Nyiri 1995
31 Wallace et al. 1997
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In the Central European buffer zone countries, cross-border trading (mainly carried out by 
Polish people and later Yugoslavs) was gradually replaced by more normal forms of import 
and export carried on through the formal market economy. Nevertheless, cross-border 
shopping continued to be very important on both the eastern and western side of the buffer 
zone as price differentials and selective shortages made this kind of activity attractive or even 
a necessity.
In the countries of the former Soviet Union cross-border trading until 1992 consisted in 
bringing goods from their countries to be sold in the buffer zone. However, after 1992, rapid 
inflation and economic crisis meant that the supply of goods ran out (factories no longer 
produced anything) and prices rose until they were above those in the buffer zone. Instead of 
coming to sell, Ukrainians, Russians and Belarusians came to shop. They bought food, 
textiles, toothpaste, soap, shampoo, and other comestibles. From this time onwards the 
economic crisis started to bite deep into people's living standards and so many households 
were forced to engage in this kind of trading, petty buying, and selling, even if they did not 
want to, just to make ends meet. At this period it also became more difficult to buy and sell in 
the buffer zone as the regularising of the retail trade meant that retailers did not want 
competition from street traders and bazaars. In addition, the buffer zone countries introduced 
more and more restrictions on travel and started to collect taxes, making cross-border traders 
illegal. Cross border traders risked a lot to buy or sell goods in the buffer zone, but they 
nevertheless continued to come in large numbers, driven by economic necessity.
Only in Poland were there less restrictions on trading and indeed trading with the eastern 
neighbours was encouraged. Large bazaars continued to exist and to attract people from 
very far afield and Polish manufacturers started to produce goods for this eastern trade, 
especially textiles. By 1996, this eastern trade (mostly in the form of suitcase trading) was 
estimated to be the third largest “industry” in Poland, accounting for billions of dollars of 
exports. The incorporation of Poland into the European Union has caused troubles in this 
respect. The EU has forced Poland to introduce more restrictions (for example visas) on her 
eastern borders, and this caused a series of demonstrations by Polish businesspeople. The 
Polish regime, advised by free marketeer Leszek Balcierowicz, is more in favour of 
unrestricted cross-border traffic.
The southern European countries mostly traded in Hungary and would come to shop at the 
“Chinese markets” in Budapest and on the border. The embargo on FRY for a period 
encouraged the generation of black-market trading in this region, and the crisis in Bulgaria in 
1996 lead to food shortages and buying in from outside there. Bulgaria on the other hand, is 
a major exporter of black market CDs and computer software, usually also through suitcase 
trading.
Our studies found that where legal protection for traders did not exist or where it was actually 
antipathetic to the activities of small-scale traders, traders introduced their own rules of trust
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and exchange based on social capital and cemented by ties of ethnicity, friendship, or 
kinship. The point is that trading was an extremely risky business. Traders were often 
breaking the law in more ways than one, and the increased control of trading which have 
developed in the buffer zone in the last years mean that they constantly run the risk of being 
arrested, deported, having their goods confiscated, or having to pay a bribe. Under these 
circumstances there was a problem of building trust. Since trust could not be build upon 
regulations, it needed to be reinforced by informal rules and social connections. The social 
networks developed in this way were often reinforced by rules of kinship and ethnicity -  
although different ethnic groups operated in different ways. The Chinese and Vietnamese 
had very strong ethnic bonds; the Ukrainians were looser. The Caucasians had very close- 
knit and extended families whereas those from other countries tended to have a more 
nuclear type of families which both limits the number of connections which can be fielded but 
also limits the number of people to whom resources must be distributed.
Small-scale traders mostly go only to the nearest abroad (although we found trading 
networks extending to the Far East, the United Arab Emirates, and particularly to Turkey). 
Therefore traders from Romania, Bulgaria, and FRY are found in Hungary. Traders from 
Belarus, Ukraine, and the Baltics or Russia are found in Poland, traders from trans- 
Carpathian Ukraine are found in Slovakia and so on. They are able to use pre-existing family 
and ethnic connections which had been severed by communism in countries where the 
borders have moved several times just in the life time of some of our respondents.
Small scale trading was therefore used to supplement the incomes of many households in 
post-communist Europe and is still important in those countries where the formal market 
economy has not been able to substitute for the retreat of the state sector. In this way 
transmigrant communities are formed which span one or even several countries and may 
involve new ethnic communities or simply reactivate older ones.
b. Labour migration
Our study of labour migration is mainly based upon interviews with 210 migrant workers who 
came to the buffer zone rather than left it. The relative prosperity of the buffer zone countries 
has created an expanding labour market which coexists alongside high unemployment. This 
is because the emphasis on the sphere of production in communist societies has tended to 
continue into post-communist ones, and although many people have moved over to the 
service sector, it still remains underdeveloped. Despite important changes, most native 
workers still work in traditional areas of the economy, and the labour market is rather 
inflexible. This means that there are vacancies for foreigners in the expanding service sector 
and also in the small business sector, traditionally a sector employing casual and informal 
workers, which may look less attractive to native workers with regular jobs and social 
security. The construction industry, for example, has blossomed in many Central European
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countries with a boom in private house building, and this is where many migrant workers 
work. Other areas where they work is in service, tourist, and catering firms, which have 
expanded since these countries opened up but often offer only casual work.
One of the main findings of the survey of labour migration in Central Europe is that labour 
migrants formed a flexible sector in the labour market. However, they were not only confined 
to the bottom rungs of the labour market. Some groups of workers -  Ukrainians and 
Romanians for example — did tend to work in the lower rungs of the labour market, living in 
temporary camps and barracks and earning much less money than native workers. They 
were often subject to exploitation from gang organisers who would take a large part of their 
money and might not even pay them at all. However, other groups of workers found jobs in 
the service sector -  such as catering for tourists, video and computer businesses etc. — and 
here knowledge of foreign languages and a good education were a distinct advantage. A 
significant group of foreign workers in fact came from Western countries -  especially the USA 
and Great Britain. Some migrant workers started small businesses -  this was also a way of 
getting a residence permit. These businesses may have specialised in import and export, 
using the contacts of the migrant abroad as a business asset. This was the case with 
Caucasian, Chinese, and Vietnamese people.
The supply of these well-educated and multi-lingual young migrants was boosted by the 
hostilities in the Balkan peninsula, so that many young people left the countries of the former 
Yugoslavia, especially Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia, because the economic collapse meant 
that they could not find suitable jobs or education there. Some were trying to avoid military 
service or were in cross-ethnic relationships. These were in a good position to start 
businesses or find jobs with multi-national and foreign companies. They formed a rather 
privileged migrant group and along with the westerners and business community were often 
earning more than native workers. Most often migrant workers were in small firms, whereas 
native workers were in large firms, and migrant workers were almost always In the new 
private sector whilst native workers were in the state or privatised sectors. We could say 
therefore that the flexible employment sector employing foreigners existed alongside of the 
normal labour market for natives. It was a parrallel labour market with vertical as well as 
horizontally drawn segmentation.
The sending countries (former Yugoslavia apart) tended often to be the countries with which 
each of the Central European nations had historical connections with and where family and 
ethnic ties continued. In Poland, the main (officially registered) migrant workers were from 
Ukraine followed by Vietnam, Belarus, Great Britain, and Russia (in that order).32 In the 
Czech Republic, they were Ukraine, Poland, USA, and Germany. In Hungary, they were 
Romania, the Former Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia, Poland, USA, UK, and Germany. In 
Slovakia they were Ukraine, Poland, USA, and former Yugoslavia. In most cases, the main
32 OECD/SOPEMI 1996.
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country was one which was not just nearby but which had some historical and linguistic 
connection with the receiving country.
The highest number of work permits for foreigners in 1995 was in the Czech Republic, where 
some 70 000 were registered, and this was followed by 20 000 in Hungary, 11 — 12000 in 
Poland and only 3 — 4000 in Slovakia. However, many people are not registered officially 
and from the interviews there were various reasons -  the problems of applying for 
permission, the fact that they preferred not to pay social insurance, and exploitation by 
unscrupulous work organisers were some of the reasons. Some people had legally entered 
the country but were working illegally, and many were doing more than one job -  perhaps 
one job legally and others illegally. Others may have begun legally but out-stayed their period 
of legal residence.
Since there was little official recruitment of foreign workers (in contrast to the strategy 
adopted by Germany for example), the foreign workers tended to be recruited by informal 
means and networks. In some cases this was a labour contractor who went to look for 
Ukrainian or Polish workers -  usually of the same nationality. In other cases, they came and 
stayed with friends or family and then relied on the "slave markets” -  places where workers 
would stand around and where employers knew where to find them. In other cases they 
found work through friends or relatives who lived in the other country. As was the case with 
trading, social capital was very important in creating and mediating these informal 
relationships. But as with trading, social capital could also be a form of exploitation, especially 
since workers were mostly illegal and not protected by the laws of the land.
In most cases they relied upon the welfare states in their home country. Since they were not 
insured in the place where they were working, they had to go home when they were sick. For 
the same reasons they could not bring children because they would be unable to go to school 
or enjoy medical facilities in the receiving countries unless they did so privately. Migrant 
workers were usually young and single or they had left their families behind them.
As with the traders, the migrant workers were found in the informal private parts of chart 3 
and therefore outside of official control and also outside of official protection, which made 
them vulnerable to exploitation of various kinds -  from the enforcers of the law (in the form of 
bribes), from their own employers, from various organised and unorganised criminai groups 
and extortionists. As with the traders, the sources of trust were often based upon social 
connections which might include ethnic and kinship networks.
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Conclusions
Now to bring together the different parts of this paper. To summarise the first part of the 
paper, we could say that although very many people are suffering economic hardship in 
Eastern and Central Europe, not very many are migrating. There are a number of 
explanations for this.
First, the characteristics of those in poverty and those who would like to migrate only overlap 
at certain points. The most poor (state sector employees, those with large families, those 
surviving mainly from self-provisioning or welfare benefits, pensioners, those with low 
education) do not see migration as an option. Rather, it is the more privileged groups -  the 
highly educated, those living in cities, the younger people -  who are more likely to migrate, 
especially if they find themselves with low incomes or unemployed. Indeed, many of the 
characteristics of potential migrants are the same as those of the "new entrepreneurs" -  the 
self employed.33 We could say therefore that migration is actually an enterprising strategy 
which could also help to augment household or individual mobility as well as only surviving.
Secondly, we need to take into account that most people in Europe live in households, and 
these households in communist countries were traditionally close-knit -  different members 
depended upon each other for support. Thus the migration of one member was actually often 
a way of supporting the rest of the household back in the sending country.
Thirdly, we need to distinguish between short-term and long-term migration. Not many people 
wanted to go abroad for long periods, but large numbers wanted to work abroad for short 
periods. In this way they could keep their properties, networks, and social security in their 
home country whilst supplementing their income. We would suggest that this is the most 
common migration strategy.
Fourthly, migrants resort to social capital (social networks and connections) as a way of 
organising their travels because it is a way of securing trust in an extremely risky 
environment. This trust can be cemented through social networks (reciprocal or patron-client 
versions), through kinship, and through ethnic networks. The extent to which people would 
resort to one or the other will depend upon which ethnic group they are from and how 
extensive their kinship networks are.
This new mobility in Central and Eastern Europe helps to form various kinds of transmigrant 
communities -  communities spanning more than one country. In the case of Central and 
Eastern Europe, this was sometimes a new community and one that might span very large 
distances. This was the case with Chinese, Vietnamese, and Caucasian settlers. It was also 
the case with Western migrants from, for example, the USA. Other migrant groups travelled
33 Wallace and Haerpfer 1998.
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only short distances -  those going from Ukraine to the Czech Republic and Slovakia for 
example. In these cases it was more often the case that they were reviving older affinities of 
language, culture, ethnicity, and sometimes even kinship because the borders are often of 
recent invention and arbitrarily drawn in this region. In some cases this was assisted by 
information technology, which allowed for the development of virtual trans-migrant 
communities.
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Appendix
The Austrian Paul Lazarsfeld Society for Social Research (PLG) has conducted a longitudinal 
large-scale and cross-national survey on economic and political changes in Central and 
Eastern Europe with an average of 10.000 interviews per year since 1991. The first and 
foremost aim of that annual survey is the regular monitoring of mass public reactions in post­
communist Central and Eastern Europe to the economic, social, and political transformations 
since the demise of communism and the subjective quality of life, especially standard of living 
of post-communist citizens. The following countries are covered in this longitudinal study:
1. Belarus * 1992 1994 1996 1998
2. Bulgaria 1991 1992 1994 1996 1998
3, Czech Republic 1991 1992 1994 1996 1998
4. Croatia * 1992 1994 1996 1998
5. Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia * * 1998
6. Hungary 1991 1992 1994 1996 1998
7. Poland 1991 1992 1994 1996 1998
8. Romania 1991 1992 1994 1996 1998
9. Slovakia 1991 1992 1994 1996 1998
10.Slovenia 1991 1992 1994 1996 1998
12. Ukraine * 1992 1994 1996 1998
13. Russia * * 1994 ★ it
The cross-national survey of the Paul Lazarsfeld Society is called the NEW DEMOCRACIES 
BAROMETER (=NDB) and was conducted in 1991 (=New Democracies Barometer I), in 
1992 (=New Democracies Barometer II), in 1994 (=New Democracies Barometer III), in 1996 
(=New Democracies Barometer IV). The last round ofthat longitudinal 10-Nation-Study took 
place in February/March 1998 (=New Democracies Barometer V).
The fieldwork of the New Democracies Barometer is subcontracted to national partners of the 
Paul Lazarsfeld Society in the 11 countries covered. All eleven national partners have to fulfil 
the so-called ESOMAR standards and are either academic institutes in the social sciences or 
commercial private enterprises. In each of the 11 countries, 1000 respondents are surveyed 
in face-to-face interviews. The basic sampling procedure in each country follows ESOMAR 
principles of a multi-stage, random probability sample in which the population is stratified 
regionally and within regions according to urban-rural divisions and town size. One hundred 
or more primary sampling units (PSU) are drawn in each country. Within each PSU individual 
respondents are chosen on the basis of standard random procedures, such as the Kish 
matrix, or selecting the household member next having a birthday.
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